Showing posts with label Nuclear War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear War. Show all posts

February 27, 2010

Nuclear War and Global Famine

An Assessment of the Extent of Projected Global Famine Resulting from Limited, Regional Nuclear War

By Ira Helfand, MD, Physicians for Social Responsibility
Copyright 2007, Royal Society of Medicine

It has been clear for some time, that a large scale nuclear war involving a substantial portion of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia would have devastating consequences far beyond these two countries and would constitute a truly global catastrophe.

The recent study by Robock et al on the climatic consequences of regional nuclear war shows clearly that even a “limited” nuclear conflict, involving as few as 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, would also have global implications with significant effects on weather patterns throughout the world.
  • Debris injected into the atmosphere from the explosions and resulting fires would produce an average surface cooling of -1.25ºC that would last for several years.

  • Even 10 years out, there would be a persistent average surface cooling of -0.5ºC.

  • Perhaps more important than the average cooling, there would be decreases in the growing season (frost free days) of 10 to 20 days in many of the most important grain producing areas throughout the world.

  • This decrease might “completely eliminate crops that have insufficient time to reach maturity.”

  • There would also be major alterations in patterns of precipitation, with a 10% reduction in global rainfall, and large reductions in the Asian summer monsoon.
  • A conflict of this magnitude would not necessarily involve the nuclear super powers. It could arise between emerging nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan.
This paper attempts to examine the potential effect on human health of these sudden climate changes. The most important direct effect of these changes in temperature and precipitation would be a decrease in global food production. While there are no accurate estimates of the shortfall in food production available at this time, there is historical experience from previous cooling episodes which suggests the impact on food supplies would be very large.

Climate and Famine: The Historical Record

In 1816, North America and Europe experienced “The year without a summer,” following the 1815 eruption of the Indonesian volcano Tambora, the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history. The average global deviation in temperature was -0.7ºC, and there was significant shortening of the growing season.
In the northeastern United States and eastern Canada, which were particularly hard hit, temperatures were actually above average during the early part of the year, and even during the summer months there were a number of periods with average or above average temperatures.

But four severe cold waves, June 6-11, July 9-11, and August 21 and August 30, brought killing frosts as far south as the Mid Atlantic States; and in New England and Quebec there was even significant snowfall in June. These periods of frost caused extensive damage to crops, particularly to the most important crop, corn (maize), much of which was destroyed.

The resulting shortages led to the extensive slaughter of livestock which could not be fed, and to a doubling in grain prices throughout the area.

In the New World, where population density was still quite low, there was relatively little hunger, except in some isolated rural communities. In the more densely populated countries of western and northern Europe, the effects were far more severe with the widespread crop failures leading to outright famine. As described in a letter published in an Albany, New York, newspaper that year:

“From the Baltic to Breslau the greater part of the land sewn with winter wheat has been obliged to be ploughed up, and of the corn that remains standing scarcely one third part of a crop is to be expected.”
Famine was reported in Ireland, the German states, Switzerland and France, and again a doubling of prices for grain occurred. In Europe, a much greater disaster was averted only because of the very strong harvest in 1815, which left grain stocks high at the outset of the famine, and another strong harvest in the summer 1817. As it was:
“In the spring of 1817 pallid, half starved people were wandering the fields, hunting for, and grubbing up, overlooked and rotting potatoes of the last year’s crop.”
Crop failures and famine were also reported in India.

The worst of the cooling caused by the Tambora eruption lasted for only one year.
A less well documented, but more prolonged episode of cooling took place between 536 and 545. This event may also have been precipitated by a large volcanic eruption in Indonesia, this time in the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra.
The historical record from this period is quite fragmentary, but references to extensive crop failure and severe famine are found in documents from Byzantium, China, Korea and Japan, and the archeological record suggests a devastating drought in South America and the western United States.
During both of these prior events, crop failures were due primarily to cooling and lower precipitation.

Availability of Food Stocks in the Event of a Regional Nuclear War

Several other factors might affect the size of available food stocks in the event of a regional nuclear war.

If the soot injected into the atmosphere in a nuclear war caused significant ozone depletion, that could cause a further major decline in actual food production.

Furthermore, food that was grown might be diverted to industrial use. Today, ethanol production is already using significant quantities of grain that would otherwise be available as food or livestock feed.

In the event that a regional nuclear war involved petroleum producing countries, or disrupted shipping from petroleum producing countries, there might be increased diversion of grain to ethanol production to try to make up for this shortfall.

Finally, if a regional war resulted in significant radioactive contamination of one or more major food producing countries, large quantities of food might need to be destroyed and significant areas of crop land might need to be taken out of production.

Current Demographic Conditions

At this point in time, we are ill prepared to deal with a major fall in world food supply. As of mid August of this year, global grain stocks were approximately 322 million tons with annual consumption at 2,098 million tons. Expressed as days of consumption, world grain stocks are, therefore, approximately 56 days, lower than at any point in the last 50 years, and dramatically lower than the 100 to 120 days of consumption available in the 1980’s and 1990’s. These stocks would not provide any significant reserve in the event of a sharp decline in global production.

At our current baseline, there are already millions of people suffering chronic malnutrition. While there is considerable academic debate about the exact scope of global malnutrition, and even about the best way to define malnutrition, the average adult needs somewhere between 1800 and 2000 calories per day, depending on his or her stature, to meet basic metabolic requirements and sustain a minimal level of physical activity. Requirements for children are dependent on age and size.

There are more than 800 million people in the world whose daily caloric intake falls below these minimum requirements. Each year some five million children in this group starve to death. A small further decline in available food would put this entire group at risk.

Given these conditions, even a modest, sudden decline in agricultural production could trigger massive famine.

At the time of the great Bengal famine of 1943, during which three million people died, food production was only 5% less than it had been on average over the preceding five years, and it was actually 13% higher than it had been in 1941 when there was not a famine.

But in 1943, after the Japanese occupation of Burma, which had historically exported grain to Bengal, the decline in food production was coupled with panic hoarding, and the price of rice rose nearly five fold, making food unaffordable to large numbers of people.

These two factors, hoarding and the severe increase in rice prices, caused an effective inaccessibility of food far more severe than the actual shortfall in production.

In the event of a major global cooling episode with widespread crop failures, a similar scenario would unfold on a global scale. Whatever the initial shortfall in agricultural production -- and it might be much higher than the modest 5% drop that triggered the Bengal famine -- there would be widespread panic, particularly if there were a general understanding that crops would continue to fail for a number of years.

In 1972, the price of both wheat and rice doubled simply in response to a tightening of world food stocks to just under 60 days of consumption. In this setting, we would expect to see much greater rises in grain prices worldwide. These price increases would put a crippling burden on whole countries which import large portions of their food supply and would make food unaffordable for hundreds of millions of individuals who are already malnourished, precisely because of their inability to afford adequate food even at current world prices.

In addition, we would probably see hoarding on a global scale. In September 2002, Canada, faced with a sharp decline in wheat production because of drought conditions, suspended wheat exports for a year. The next year the European Union took similar action, as did Russia. And in August 2004 Vietnam indicated it would not export rice until the following spring.

In the event of a regional nuclear war, the grain exporting states would be faced with major crop losses and the prospect of bad harvests for the next several years. It is probable that they would take similar action and refuse to export whatever grain surplus they might have, retaining it instead as a domestic reserve.

This year global grain consumption is about 2,098 million tons, of which 220 million tons, or 11% is imported. Many countries which currently do not have major problems with widespread malnutrition are nonetheless dependent on imported food. For example, North Africa, home to more than 150 million people, with average caloric consumption well above the minimal level, imports 45% of its food. A number of other countries in the Middle East, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are also dependent on imports for 50% or more of their grain consumption. The wealthier of these countries might initially be able to obtain some grain on the international market by bidding up the price, but as the extent of the global crop failures became clear, grain producing countries would tighten their export bans, and the hundreds of millions of people dependent on grain imports would also face starvation.

Famine Deaths and Synergistic Effects

Somewhat paradoxically, the ongoing effects of global warming might make the world more vulnerable in the event of a sudden cooling event. For example, in Africa, “increasingly variable growing season conditions are disrupting subsistence agricultural production leading to famine.” Populations already weakened by the negative effects on food production of global warming would be less able to withstand a sudden further decline in accessible food.

It is of course impossible to estimate with accuracy the full extent of the global famine that would follow a regional nuclear war. But it seems reasonable to conclude that few of the 800 million people who are already malnourished would survive if their already substandard intake decreased by even 10% for a whole year. If the crop failures and resulting food shortages persisted for several years, their fate would be sealed. Additional hundreds of millions whose current intake is marginal, or who live in countries dependent on food imports, would also be at risk, particularly if the famine persisted.

Thus, in the event of a protracted global cooling, triggered by a limited, regional nuclear war, it seems reasonable to fear that the total global death toll could exceed one billion from starvation alone. Two other issues need to be considered as well.

  1. First, there is a very high likelihood that famine on this scale would lead to major epidemics of infectious diseases.

    The prolonged cooling and resultant famine in 536-545 was accompanied by a major outbreak of plague, which developed over the next half century into a global pandemic. The famine of 1816 triggered an epidemic of typhus in Ireland that spread to much of Europe; and the famine conditions in India the same year led to a an outbreak of cholera that has been implicated in the first global cholera pandemic. The well studied Great Bengal Famine of 1943 was associated with major local epidemics of cholera, malaria, smallpox, and dysentery.

    Despite the advances in medical technology of the last half century, a global famine on the scale anticipated would provide the ideal breeding ground for epidemics involving any or all of these illness. In particular, the vast megacities of the developing world, crowded, and often lacking adequate sanitation in the best of times, would almost certainly see major outbreaks of infectious diseases; and illnesses, like plague, which have not been prevalent in recent years, might again become major health threats.

  2. Finally we need to consider the immense potential for war and civil conflict that would be created by famine on this scale.

    Within nations where famine is widespread, there would almost certainly be food riots; and competition for limited food resources might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosities. Among nations, armed conflict seems highly likely as states dependent on imports adopt whatever means are at their disposal in an attempt to maintain access to food supplies.

It is impossible to estimate the additional global death toll from disease and further warfare that this “limited regional” nuclear war might cause but, given the worldwide scope of the climate effects, the dead from these causes might well number in the hundreds of millions.

Ira Helfand is an emergency physician and internist practicing in Springfield, Massachusetts, and is on the boards of both Physicians for Social Responsibility and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. He has written extensively on the issues of accidental nuclear war and nuclear terrorism.

October 30, 2009

The Threat of a Nuclear World War III

Escalation Scenarios: The Third World War and Its Aftermath

By Carol Moore, CarolMoore.net
September 23, 2009

URGENT: Scenario 3 - Israel Bombs Iranian Nuclear Plants
Nuclear power plants are nuclear war targets which will spread massive additional radiation over thousands of square miles.

A world nuclear war is one that involves most or all nuclear powers releasing a large proportion of their nuclear weapons at targets in nuclear, and perhaps non-nuclear, states. Such a war could be initiated accidentally, aggressively or pre-emptively and could continue and spread through these means or by retaliation by a party attacked by nuclear weapons.

While some speak of “limited nuclear war,” it is likely that any nuclear war will quickly escalate and spiral out of control because of the “use them or loose them” strategy: If you don’t use all your nuclear weapons you are likely to have them destroyed by the enemy’s nuclear weapons.

Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missile or long-range bomber. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons.

Below are six scenarios by which world nuclear war could come about. While these are some of the major scenarios and combination of attacks and retaliations, they are hardly exhaustive. U.S., Russian and other nuclear nations’ weapons strategizers deal with these scenarios every day but rarely let mere citizens in on their grizzly thinking. Citizens must end their denial and become aware of such scenarios.

GENERAL SCENARIOS

Accidental: Since the United States and Russia have “launch on warning” systems that send off rockets before it is confirmed a nuclear attack is underway, any tensions between them can lead to massive nuclear war within thirty minutes of a warning — no matter how false the warning may be.


Aggressive: One or more nations decide to use weapons against nuclear or non-nuclear nations in order to promote an economic, political or military goal, as part of an ongoing war or as a first strike nuclear attack. (The state, of course, may claim it is a pre-emptive, retaliatory or even an accidental attack.)

Pre-emptive: One or more nations believe (correctly or incorrectly) or claim to believe that another nuclear nation is about to use nuclear weapons against its nuclear, military, industrial or civilian targets, and pre-emptively attacks that nation. May result from political or military “brinkmanship.”

Retaliatory: Use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack — or even a conventional, chemical or biological attack by a non-nuclear nation.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THESE SCENARIOS

There is a whole body of knowledge and assumptions that is taken into account when putting together scenarios like those below. My bottom line assumption is that any nuclear exchange has an excellent chance of resulting in a series of escalations that will spiral out of control, setting off a round of exchanges among various enemies under a “use it or lose it” philosophy, as well as among the treaty allies of the relevant nuclear powers and their allies. This continues until most of the planet’s 20,000 odd nuclear weapons are exhausted. In making “limited nuclear war” calculations, all nations should assume “whatever can go wrong, will go wrong.” Unfortunately, too many strategizers assume they can conduct limited strikes and keep them limited.

Related assumptions include:

** Any nuclear attack on a primary Russian target like Moscow, St. Petersburg, or nuclear command headquarters by any nation or group, known or unknown, could lead to a commander turning on “The Dead Hand” strategy and/or prompt one or more of Russia’s semi-autonomous military field commanders to retaliate against U.S. and European nuclear targets. Attacks on secondary targets or nuclear detonations very close to Russian soil also might lead to some sort of nuclear escalation.

** Any nuclear attack on U.S. and/or European sites by any nation or group, known or unknown, probably will result in massive U.S. and/or European retaliation against the known or assumed perpetrators or their known or assumed allies.

** It is likely that the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India and Pakistan will use some of their weapons to attack other nuclear and non-nuclear nations which might threaten them after they have been devastated by nuclear war.

** Any nuclear attack on Israel by terrorists, or Pakistan, Russia or China, will result in Israel’s surviving land, air and submarine-carried or based-issiles being used against Arab and Muslim capitals. A particularly devastating attack (including chemical or biological weapons) possibly might result in a full scale “Samson Option” attack on European and Russian targets. The latter, of course, would result in Russian retaliation against the United States, perhaps its punishment for not having done enough to protect Israel.

** Any nation’s use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear nation will be only somewhat less inflammatory than using them against a nuclear nation, especially if that nation has many treaty allies. It will ratchet all nuclear nations' alert systems and lead to unforeseeable consequences that could easily spiral to world nuclear war.

NOTE: COLORS OF LINES AND DESCRIPTIONS ARE COORDINATED

Aggressive Pre-Emptive Retaliatory Accidental

SCENARIO 1.

RUSSIA OR U.S. MISTAKENLY INTERPRETS GLITCH DURING TIME OF TENSION AS NUCLEAR ATTACK, LEADING TO WORLD NUCLEAR WAR

During time of minor or major political tension, especially active U.S. bombings of other nations or any use of nuclear weapons, Russian commanders' faulty early-warning-system detects false evidence of a nuclear attack from the United States. Russia launches a large proportion of its weapons at the U.S. and pre-emptively at U.S. European and Israeli allies, as well as China, India and Pakistan to cripple their nuclear capability. The U.S. and Europe retaliate at Russia and the U.S. attacks China to destroy its nuclear stocks. Israel retaliates against Russia and initiates aggressive attacks against Arab and Muslim capitols. India and China may strike each other to destroy any remaining nuclear or other military capability. (It is less likely that the U.S. would experience such a glitch; if so, the U.S. would strike Russia and China; they would retaliate against the U.S. and Europe and probably attack other potentially hostile nuclear powers to knock out their capability.)

SCENARIO 2.

U.S. OR RUSSIA THREATEN OR ENGAGE IN MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST SMALLER NATION, STARTING ESCALATION TO WORLD NUCLEAR WAR


Russia and US engage in threats over further U.S. aggression in the Middle East or over Russia's refusal to withdraw troops from the former Soviet Republic Georgia. Russia and/or the U.S. pre-emptively strike the others' nuclear targets, leading to further rounds of retaliatory exchanges. Russia strikes pre-emptively at U.S. European and Israeli allies, as well as China, India and Pakistan to cripple their nuclear capability. Europe retaliates at Russia, and the U.S. attacks China to destroy any remaining nuclear stocks. Israel retaliates against Russia and initiates revenge attacks against Arab and Muslim capitols. India and China may strike each other to destroy any remaining nuclear or other military capability.

SCENARIO 3.

ISRAEL ATTACKS IRAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND/OR SYRIA AND LEBANON, WHICH RETALIATE WITH MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL OR WMD ROCKET ATTACKS; ISRAEL RETALIATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ESCALATING TO WORLD NUCLEAR WAR


Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities and/or Syria and Lebanon. These countries respond with massive rocket attacks using conventional bombs and even some chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Israel responds with nuclear strikes against these nations and Pakistan. Outraged Pakistan retaliates against Israel and pre-emptively attacks Israel's ally/Pakistan's enemy India, which retaliates. Israel initiates "Samson option" and attacks Arab and Muslim capitols, as well as "antisemitic" Europe and Russia. Russian regional commanders retaliate against Israel, its ally the U.S., and U.S. European allies and China, to destroy its nuclear capability. The U.S. retaliates against Russia and hits China's nuclear capability. China uses any remaining nuclear weapons against Russia, the U.S. and India. India retaliates against China.

India and Pakistan in 2002

India and Pakistan have repeatedly threatened nuclear war against each other, most seriously in the last few years. In late December 2002 Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, addressing Air Force veterans in Karachi, said:

The last year “personally” conveyed a clear “message” to Prime Minister Vajpayee, “through every international leader who came to Pakistan,” namely, that Indian troops “should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan” if they “moved a single step across the international border or the Line of Control.”
In response Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez said:
“We can take a bomb or two, or more. When we respond, there will be no Pakistan.”
About the same time former Army Chief of Staff Aslam Beg, then heading a right-wing Pakistani think tank said:
“Our policy of deterrence is India-specific. No matter who comes for us, Israel, the United States or India we will take on India. If someone is thinking of taking on Pakistan, they should know we will take on India.”
And despite subsequent detente between the two nations during the remainder of 2003, as late as fall 2003, Ariel Sharon visited India, worrying Pakistan that he was once again proposing India do a surgical strike against Pakistani nuclear assets. Once any such Indian-Pakistani nuclear exchange began, there are a number of scenarios by which it could escalate into accidental or intentional world nuclear war.

The Samson Option

From Wikipedia (for the 1991 book by Seymour Hersh, see The Samson Option.)

The Samson Option is a term used to describe Israel's alleged deterrence strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons as a “last resort” against nations whose military attacks threaten its existence, and possibly against other targets as well. Israel refuses to admit it has nuclear weapons or to describe how it would use them, an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, also known as “nuclear opacity.” This has made it difficult for anyone outside the Israeli government to definitively describe its true nuclear policy, while still allowing Israel to influence the perceptions, strategies and actions of other governments.

As early as 1976, the CIA believed that Israel possessed 10 to 20 nuclear weapons. By 2002 it was estimated that the number had increased to between 75 and 200 nuclear weapons. Kenneth S. Brower has estimated as many as 400 nuclear weapons. These can be launched from land, sea and air. This gives Israel a second strike option even if much of the country is destroyed.

The term “Samson Option” has also been used more generally in reference to Israel’s nuclear program. Commentators have also used the term in reference to situations where non-nuclear actors, such as Saddam Hussein, Yassir Arafat and Hezbollah threatened conventional weapons retaliation, and even to United States President George W. Bush's foreign policy.

Read the rest of the scenarios here

Historical Close Calls to World War Three

Before the end of the Second World War, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed concern that given the enormous size of Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end of the war, and the perception that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was unreliable, there existed a Soviet threat to Western Europe. In April-May 1945, British Armed Forces developed Operation Unthinkable; its primary goal was “to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and the British Empire.” However, the plan was rejected by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee as militarily unfeasible.

With the development of the arms race, before the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, an apocalyptic war between the United States and the Soviet Union was considered plausible. The Doomsday Clock has served as a symbol of historic World War III close calls since the Truman Doctrine went into effect in 1947. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is generally thought to be the historical point at which the risk of World War III was closest. Other potential starts have included the following:

1948

Berlin Blockade. Soviet military forces stopped all commerce into West Berlin which caused a humanitarian and political crisis. In response, Western allies sent in air lifts to supply West Berlin.


August 29, 1949

Soviet Union successfully conducted tests with nation’s first atomic bomb, RDS-1.


1950–1953

Korean War. General MacArthur planned to invade and bomb China to eliminate the threat of communism in eastern Asia.


August 12, 1953

Soviet Union successfully conducts tests of nation’s first hydrogen bomb, Joe-4.


July 26, 1956 – March, 1957

Suez Crisis: The conflict pitted Egypt against an alliance between France, the United Kingdom and Israel. When the USSR threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN Lester B. Pearson feared a larger war and urged the British and French to withdraw. The Eisenhower administration, also fearing a wider war, applied pressure to the United Kingdom to withdraw, including a threat to create a currency crisis by dumping US holdings of British debt. Lester B. Pearson later received a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.


June 4 – November 9, 1961

Berlin Crisis of 1961.


October 15 – October 28, 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis: The conflict pitted the United States against an alliance between the USSR and Cuba. The USSR was attempting to place several launch sites in Cuba in response to the United States installation of missiles in Turkey. The United States response included dispersal of Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers to civilian airfields around the United States and war games in which the United States Marine Corps landed against a dictator named “ORTSAC” (Castro spelt backwards). For a brief while, the U.S. military went to DEFCON 3, while SAC went to DEFCON 2. The crisis peaked on October 27, when a U-2 (piloted by Rudolph Anderson) was shot down over Cuba and another U-2 over the USSR was almost intercepted when it strayed over Siberia, after Curtis LeMay (U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff) had neglected to enforce Presidential orders to suspend all overflights. See also: Vasiliy Arkhipov.


October 24, 1973

Yom Kippur War: As the Yom Kippur War was winding down, a Soviet threat to intervene on Egypt’s behalf caused the United States to go to DEFCON 3.


September 26, 1983

False “US First Strike” Alarm: Soviet early warning systems showed that a US ICBM attack had been launched. Colonel Stanislav Petrov, in command of the monitoring facility, correctly interpreted the warnings as a computer error, even though this was against standing orders.


November 1983

Exercise Able Archer: The USSR mistook a test of NATO’s nuclear-release procedures as a fake cover for a NATO attack and subsequently raised its nuclear alert level. It was not until afterwards that the US realized how close it had come to nuclear war. At the time of the exercise the Soviet Politburo was without a healthy functioning head due to the failing health of then leader Yuri Andropov.


January 25, 1995

Norwegian rocket incident: A Norwegian missile launch for scientific research was detected from Andøya Rocket Range and thought to be an attack on Russia, launched from a submarine five minutes away from Moscow. Norway had notified the world that it would be making the launch, but the Russian Defense Ministry had neglected to notify those monitoring Russia’s nuclear defense systems.


June 12 – June 26, 1999

Pristina airport standoff: Russian and NATO forces had a standoff over the Pristina Airport in Kosovo.

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